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Abstract
Systems that provide network traffic anonymity typically
focus on wide-area network topologies, and exploit the
infeasibility of eavesdropping on all links to prevent at-
tackers from determining communication peers. This ap-
proach is inappropriate for high-security wireless local-
area networks, since it does not obscure the traffic vol-
ume, allowing attackers to identify critical nodes (e.g., a
military HQ) and, given the ability of an attacker to ob-
tain a global view of all communications, the relative ease
of identifying the source and destination of traffic flows.
These weaknesses derive from the fact that, whereas in
wide-area networks the sender, the receiver and the ad-
versary are on different physical links, in wireless net-
works they may share a single broadcast link. Moreover,
the adversary can easily find the physical location of the
transmitter and thereby identify the entity sending the
traffic, not just its network identity. We introduce Wire-
less Anonymous Routing (war), an approach to achieve
anonymity in a broadcast network. We describe a for-
mal threat model for war and compare it to the tradi-
tional anonymity approaches. We show that these are
inadequate when applied to the broadcast model, and de-
scribe new protocols that preserve security with better
performance, adequately addressing the requirements of
security-critical environments. We provide analytical and
some preliminary experimental evidence that our proto-
cols achieve anonymity at a reasonable cost.
Keywords: Anonymity, MANET, onion routing, source
routing, wireless
1 Introduction
Anonymity and resistance to traffic analysis is an inter-
esting and difficult problem in computer networking. In
most modern networks, including IP-based ones, commu-
nication peers inherently identify the sources and destina-
tions of traffic to routers, gateways, and ancillary servers.
In packet-switched networks, the network-level addresses
are visible to anyone with access to any link over which the
traffic flows. An especially difficult aspect of this prob-
lem involves hiding various aspects of the identity of peers
from each other.
A number of schemes for anonymity have been devel-
oped in recent years; most are variants on “mix networks”
[13], in which traffic is routed among participants in the
network in an effort to hide the true source and/or desti-
nation of the messages. These schemes vary in details
concerning such issues as whether and between whom
cryptography is used, how membership is managed, at
which layer of the protocol stack they operate, whom the
identity is hidden from, and so on. What most of these
schemes have in common is the assumption (and exploita-
tion of the fact) that they operate in a wide-area network
with multiple links, where it is infeasible for the adver-
sary to monitor all links and to obtain global information
about network traffic.
This assumption excludes an important class of net-
works, one in which many interesting requirements for
anonymity may be found: broadcast (typically wireless)
communication systems. Here, not only can the adversary
usually listen to all traffic, but he can also identify the
physical location of the sender by using radio-frequency
direction-finding techniques. While the sender may be al-
most impossible to conceal, the receiver, being generally
“passive” need not reveal his identity, or even his pres-
ence, to anyone in order to receive a message. In such
environments, it is also relatively straightforward to iden-
tify communication hubs, such as a command-and-control
post; these may be singled out for directed attacks.
These differences break (or render terribly inefficient)
the standard anonymity protocols designed for large net-
works. At the same time, the broadcast nature of such
networks tends to exacerbate privacy and traffic analysis
issues, which tend to be either of no concern or of extreme
importance to the users of the network, especially in ap-
plications such as military communications, some types
of sensor networks, wireless mesh networks, etc.
International Journal of Network Security, Vol.8, No.1, PP.37–51, Jan. 2009 38
In this paper, we advance the notion that wireless net-
works (e.g., sensor or ad hoc networks) are an interesting
and not well explored research area for anonymity and
identity protection. In particular, we introduce a security
model for privacy in such networks, a suite of protocols
that provide anonymity under the model, and analytical
and experimental results that suggest that these proto-
cols are useful in specific scenarios where the tradeoff be-
tween anonymity and performance are—within reason—
weighed toward the former, e.g., a battlefield wireless
communication network. We also suggest open problems
and directions for future work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents our model, including the communi-
cation infrastructure and the security model. Section 3
presents our protocol variants and their security proper-
ties. We discuss our prototype implementation in Sec-
tion 4 and show some preliminary performance results in
Section 5. Section 6 gives an overview of related work.
2 The war Model
2.1 Communications Infrastructure and
Environment
We consider a communication network where stations can
communicate only through a public broadcast (usually
wireless) channel. Every station listens for transmissions
in “promiscuous mode,” meaning they can receive the
transmissions of every other station. Stations can exhibit
a high degree of mobility, and can join and leave the net-
work at any time. Some stations may have a gateway to
another network, such as the Internet.
For simplicity, we assume a wireless broadcast medium
in which only one station at a time can transmit a
message, which is potentially received by all other sta-
tions within communications range; receipt of a particu-
lar transmission by any given station is not guaranteed by
the medium itself, however. As a consequence of transmit-
ting, the station may reveal identifying information (such
as its physical position or unique transmitter character-
istics, e.g., the exact oscillation frequency of its crystals)
about itself. Receiving a message, on the other hand,
is entirely passive, and does not reveal any information
about the receivers. Every station can act as both a trans-
mitter and a receiver, but is identified to others only when
it transmits. Note that “Tempest”-type attacks against
receivers can invalidate this assumption by revealing in-
formation about the internal state of processors, but we
do not consider such attacks here. In other words, we as-
sume abstract characteristics similar to those of most con-
ventional general-purpose radio-based schemes, including
commercially available wireless networks such as 802.11
systems operating in “ad hoc” mode. The network ab-
straction we are providing is that of an unreliable packet
local network, on top of which we could run IP. The ser-
vice characteristics may not be suitable for all higher-layer
protocols, as the performance results we get for TCP show
in Section 4. Part of our future work includes extending
our model to take into consideration real-world wireless
phenomena [1, 19].
We refer to packets transmitted by the stations as ra-
diograms, to distinguish them from IP packets or higher
level message abstractions. Each radiogram is sent by a
single sender, and can be intercepted by anyone in range.
Every radiogram consists of two parts: a sender ID, which
contains the public key of the transmitting station, and
an encrypted payload. This requirement is made without
loss of generality, because our threat model will assume
that the adversary can always identify the sender of a ra-
diogram (as this is hard to conceal in a wireless network).
Thus, adding the ID does not help the adversary, but can
be used by the “good” stations to identify the sender, and
maintain a list of current group members. We assume that
the payload is encrypted using a symmetric or asymmetric
encryption scheme that should satisfy the standard notion
of semantic security [26], and that it contains enough re-
dundancy to know unambiguously whether an attempt to
decrypt it with a certain key has succeeded. Therefore,
we can associate with each radiogram a set of receivers,
which are those stations that can successfully decrypt the
payload1. Finally, we assume for simplicity that there is
a fixed radiogram size, with short payloads padded out to
this size. The model can easily be extended to support a
fixed number of different radiogram sizes.
Consider a station si that wants to send a message m
(such as an IP packet) to station sj . We refer to si as
the originator of m and sj as the target of m. A Wire-
less Anonymous Routing (war) protocol specifies how si
should originate such communication, decide which other
stations will be involved, and the series of radiograms that
need to be transmitted by these stations so that m will
eventually reach sj . For analysis purposes, each radio-
gram sent in a war protocol will be associated with one
corresponding high-level message, or considered a cover
radiogram if it is not associated with any message.2 The
sender of a radiogram does not necessarily know (nor
should it) whether the radiogram is cover traffic or not,
what message it is associated with, or who the receivers
of the radiogram are. We refer to all high-level messages
that are being delivered among originator/target pairs as
the core traffic in the system.
Our only formal correctness requirement will be that
if si originates the delivery of m to sj, then sj will even-
tually receive m (so long as neither of them has left the
group of active stations and the network is not saturated).
Clearly, to make the protocol usable, mere delivery is not
enough, and round trip time, as well as other performance
parameters, should be reasonable. The security require-
ments of a war protocol are discussed below.
1In our protocols, each radiogram will have a single successful
receiver.
2Practical optimizations such as sending several short messages
in a single radiogram are beyond the scope of this paper.
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2.2 Adversary Model
We consider two types of adversaries: a listening adver-
sary and a Byzantine adversary, each of which can be
either non-adaptive, adaptive, or pro-active (following the
standard cryptographic notions).
A listening adversary can monitor all traffic, and iden-
tify the sender of each radiogram. In addition, the ad-
versary is able to monitor the internal state of a certain
set of (compromised) stations (including secret keys, ran-
domness, computation of radiogram to be sent, etc.). This
adversary is honest-but-curious, in that he follows the pro-
tocol in each station, but tries to deduce information in
order to compromise anonymity. The set of compromised
stations may be restricted to be in some access struc-
ture (a subset of the powerset of the set of all stations),
such as “all subsets of at most five stations.” To cap-
ture a simpler adversary who is capable of listening only
to transmissions, and does not have access to any other
station’s internal state, we can take the set of internally
compromised stations to be the empty set.
A Byzantine adversary is stronger. Like the listening
adversary, it can monitor all traffic and the internal state
of some set of stations in the access structure. In addi-
tion, it can also maliciously control up to t stations, for
some parameter t. The adversary can make controlled
stations behave arbitrarily, including injecting new radio-
grams, dropping radiograms, or changing radiograms that
were supposed to be transmitted.
We can make a further (by now standard) distinction
between a non-adaptive, adaptive, or pro-active adver-
sary, depending on when the corrupted stations are cho-
sen. A non-adaptive adversary chooses the set of stations
to be corrupted (and the t stations to be controlled in the
Byzantine case) at the beginning of his attack. An adap-
tive adversary may choose which stations to corrupt as
his attack progresses, based on the information gathered
so far (but without violating the access structure). A pro-
active adversary can adaptively choose which stations to
corrupt, but can also choose (synchronously) to shift its
corruption from a certain station to another, granting the
previously corrupted station healed. Here, the only re-
striction is that the adversary does not violate the access
structure in any particular time period. More details on
pro-active security (in a different context) may be found
in [10, 31, 45].
2.3 Security Goals
Our goal is to maintain anonymity of both originator and
target of a given message. Clearly, if an adversary cor-
rupts the originator, he can see the originated message
m and its target.3 It is also clear that if the adversary
corrupts the target station, he can figure this out upon
delivery of the message. Anonymity should be maintained
3The originator must know the target to which he sends a mes-
sage. But, this target may be specified in terms of a public key that
is a pseudonym of an unknown party, such as a public key that was
previously sent within an anonymous message.
for all other cases (including anonymity of the originator
when the target is corrupted). These main anonymity
goals are formalized below for a listening, non-adaptive
adversary. A discussion of stronger adversaries and addi-
tional goals follows.
Let S be the set of all stations, 2S its powerset, C ⊆ 2S
an access structure, and C ∈ C the set of compromised
stations by a listening adversary. Denote its view, after
an execution of a protocol in which an originator si
delivers a message to a target sj , by the random variable
V kC (i, j), where k is the security parameter. This view
contains all radiograms sent in the network, and the
internal state of all nodes in C.
Originator and Target Anonymity to Observer:
We require that for any message delivered, as long as the
originator and target are not corrupted, the adversary’s
view reveals no information about their identity. That
is, for all i1, j1, i2, j2 6∈ C, {V
k




Complete Anonymity. A stronger requirement is that
as long as the originator is not corrupted (even if the tar-
get is), the adversary’s view reveals no information about
the identity of the originator. If the target is not cor-
rupted then no information about its identity should be
revealed either. Note that if the target (final destination
of an anonymous message) is corrupted, the message can
be decrypted, which might contain the identity of the orig-
inator, e.g., as part of network protocol headers (we do
not restrict the content of messages!). Even in that case,
however, the adversary will not know which radio device
corresponds to a given originator. Thus, in formalizing
this goal we use a randomized message. We denote by
RV kC (i, j) the randomized view of the adversary after an
execution of a protocol in which an originator si deliv-
ers a uniformly chosen message to target sj . We require
that originator and target anonymity to observer is main-
tained, and that in addition, for all i1, i2 6∈ C and for all
j ∈ C, we have that {RV kC (i1, j)} and {RV
k
C (i2, j)} are
indistinguishable.
An additional goal which may be desired, is that
of hiding the existence of communication. That
is, an adversary cannot even determine whether any
communication is taking place (unless he has corrupted
an originator or target of such communication). Instead
of formalizing this goal directly, we formalize an even
stronger goal which implies it, is achieved by our main
protocol, and has other advantages.
Anonymity Per Radiogram. For each radiogram r
that is sent during protocol execution, let si, sj be cor-
respondingly originator and target (where sj = ⊥ for a
cover radiogram). We require that, as long as si, sj 6∈ C,
the adversary’s view gives him no information about sj .
In particular, the adversary cannot distinguish the cases
where r is a cover radiogram or a radiogram that can be
decrypted by a certain sj .
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We note that anonymity per radiogram should not
be viewed as a required goal, since the real concerns are
with the core traffic (high-level messages). However, this
is a useful tool since, if achieved, it can be proved to
imply originator and target anonymity to observer, as
well as hiding the existence of messages.
Security against Stronger Adversaries. We defined
our anonymity goals for a listening, non-adaptive adver-
saries, and our analysis will concentrate on this setting
as well. The formal definitions for adaptive or pro-active
adversaries, and for Byzantine adversaries are quite com-
plex, and are not included here (some of the issues are
similar to those in defining secure computation against
active adversaries). For example, if the adversary is adap-
tive, it is not enough to ask that originator and target
remain anonymous as long as the adversary has not cor-
rupted them, since the protocol might allow an adver-
sary to adaptively corrupt parties so that the originator
and target are always corrupted with high probability.
Such an attack should be prohibited by the definition. Of
course, for certain protocols it may be possible to show
that an adaptive or pro-active adversary cannot gain more
information than a non-adaptive adversary.
We note that a general transformation from a protocol
secure against a listening adversary to one secure against
a Byzantine adversary, can proceed by requiring each ra-
diogram’s payload to be authenticated with respect to the
public key in its first ID part (and discarding radiograms
that fail to authenticate). The anonymity features will
be preserved, although reliable delivery may no longer be
guaranteed (i.e., the system may become susceptible to
denial-of-service attacks). Reliability can be addressed by
other means, and is not the focus of the current work.
2.4 Discussion
Our anonymity goals are strong, and should be achieved
regardless of the core traffic characteristics. To achieve
our strongest goals (including hiding the existence of com-
munication), the pattern of radiograms to be sent by a
node should be independent of the volume, content, or
any other aspect of the core traffic. That is, the proto-
cols should specify the size and frequency of radiograms
to be sent at each node, e.g., by sending at a constant
rate (which may depend on the overall traffic volume and
group size, but not the core traffic). To an observer,
the distribution of these radiograms will look the same
throughout the protocol.
We note that weaker goals of anonymity were some-
times posed by previous works, such as mix-based mech-
anisms (see Section 6). For example, anonymity may be
achieved based on statistical properties of the core traffic
(requiring high volume). Or it may be allowed to leak the
existence or even content of messages, as long as there is
no linkability between a message originated by a source
and a message delivered to a destination. We do not elab-
orate on these weaker goals as our work provides stronger
security guarantees.
Finally, we should mention that if an adversary can
gain arbitrarily many identities (public keys), then it is
clearly easy for him to control a large number (or frac-
tion) of nodes. This problem is outside of our model, and
should be prevented at the public-key infrastructure level.
However, we note that if a protocol achieves anonymity
against an arbitrary access structure C (without a size
limitation), then this attack does not help the adversary.
Indeed, this is the case with our main protocol, which
achieves source and destination anonymity to observer for
arbitrary C.
3 Protocols and Analysis
3.1 Basic Protocols
Here, we describe some basic war protocols, which
demonstrate general solutions and ideas that will be used
by our main construction in the Section 3.2. In all the
protocols, a station joins by broadcasting its public key,
and then listens for a while to hear public keys of other
(existing and new) members.
3.1.1 From Strong Anonymous Routing to war
Previous practical approaches and systems to anonymous
routing in networks require varying anonymity proper-
ties, under different adversarial models. Almost all these
adversarial models consider an adversary that has access
only to part of the network links, and cannot obtain global
information about the network traffic. However, some
works (cf. [2]) require anonymity against an adversary
that can monitor all traffic, like our listening adversary.
We refer to such protocols as strong anonymous routing
protocols.
It easy to see that such protocols can be transformed
to our wireless setting, where instead of sending the ra-
diogram r on a link from station i to j, we have station i
broadcast the payload (j, E(PKj, r)), where E(PKj, r) is
the (asymmetric) encryption of r under the public key of
station j. Such a transformation preserves the anonymity
guarantees, although not necessarily reliability (as the
network is dynamic and stations leave as they please).
The transformation also maintains the performance of the
original schemes, with respect to a clique network topol-
ogy. This transformation provides several candidate war
protocols, such as those adapted from variants of Beimel
and Dolev [2].
However, these protocols have weaknesses in terms of
performance and security; since such protocols were de-
signed for a fixed point-to-point network, they cannot
take advantage of the broadcast channel, and thus im-
pose higher communication overheads. Intuitively, these
protocols obtain anonymity despite the broadcast chan-
nel, but cannot use it for improved performance. Such
protocols may also exhibit particularly bad performance
in our clique setting, e.g., if performance depends on the
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number of edges in the network. In terms of security, these
protocols achieve anonymity against a listening-only non-
adaptive adversary. They do not achieve complete source
anonymity, and their corruption threshold under which
anonymity against adaptive adversary is achieved is worse
than our constructions below.
3.1.2 From Anonymous Routing to war
Starting from any anonymous routing protocol for a
point-to-point network (such as a mix or onion routing),
we can transform it to a war protocol by using generic
mechanisms to create virtual point-to-point links out of
the broadcast channel, and running the given protocol on
top of them. Some more details follow.
As a first step, we can use the broadcast channel to
implement secure channels for each pair of nodes4. This
simply reduces to key exchange among each pair (cf. [11,
12]), where the key is then used for symmetric encryption
of radiograms between the pair of nodes. For example, we
can use a Diffie-Hellman-based key exchange, ending up
with a secret key of the form gxy for each of the n2 pairs of
current members. Alternatively, instead of establishing n2
secure channels, public key encryption can be used, where
to send a message to sj , the encryption of the message
under sj ’s public key is broadcast. Here it is essential
to use an encryption scheme providing key-privacy [4],
namely where a ciphertext does not reveal under which
key the message was encrypted. While standard RSA
does not satisfy this, several variations of RSA, as well
as other encryption schemes, are known to satisfy key-
privacy [4]. By directly broadcasting the message, this
already guarantees originator and target anonymity to an
observer (though the target will know who the originator
was). For complete anonymity, the following step is taken.
As a second step, we use the established (virtual) se-
cure channels to implement the point-to-point protocol.
Namely, instead of sending the radiogram r on a link from
station i to j, we have station i broadcast the payload
E(ski,j , r), where E(ski,j , r) is the (symmetric) encryp-
tion of r under the secret key of the pair (i, j); or, for
the public-key alternative, station i broadcasts the pay-
load E(PKj , r), which is the (asymmetric) encryption of
r under the public key of station j. For each broadcast
radiogram from node i, every node j tries to decrypt the
payload using its key. If the decryption fails, the radio-
gram is discarded (as it was intended for a different re-
ceiver). If the decryption succeeds, the node continues as
specified by the underlying protocol.
For example, we briefly describe the scheme using sym-
metric keys established through key-exchange, and the
onion routing [49] protocol. A node that wants to send a
message to some group member, chooses at random a set
of M − 1 current group members, where M is a security
parameter. It then creates an “onion” of M encrypted
encapsulated payloads. The innermost layer is encrypted
4An authenticated broadcast channel is required, and be
achieved using the public-key infrastructure of joining members.
with the public key of the intended destination. Each suc-
cessive layer consists of an (asymmetric) encryption of the
previous layers’ payload together with the identity of the
corresponding group member, under the public key of the
next group member. Finally, the onion is encrypted using
the symmetric key of the intended last group member in
the chain, and broadcast.
Upon broadcast of a radiogram by station i, all stations
try to decrypt it (using their symmetric keys with i), but
only one station (the receiver) succeeds. The receiver fur-
ther decrypts using its asymmetric private key, to find a
payload r consisting of an index j and an encapsulated
payload r′, requiring the receiver to encrypt r′ using its
secret key with node j, and broadcast the resulting pay-
load. This continues until the innermost layer is reached
(in which case the payload is decrypted to the actual mes-
sage). Note that this protocol involves only a symmetric
decryption operation for each station, per broadcast ra-
diogram, which is quite fast (if we were to use public key
encryption on the last layer as well, each node would have
to apply heavy asymmetric decryption on each broadcast
radiogram, though the legitimate receiver would not have
to perform further symmetric encryption/decryption).
Anonymity properties are inherited from the underly-
ing protocol. In particular, using onion-like mechanisms
(similar to those used in Mixmaster or Mixminion) with
an onion of depth M , it can be shown that complete
anonymity is guaranteed as long as there are two con-
secutive uncorrupted nodes in the used onion, and in par-
ticular, as long as the adversary has corrupted at most
M/2 onion nodes in total. This is because each node
knows the identity of its onion-neighbors (i.e., the sender
of the previous radiogram, and the receiver of the next
radiogram). This implies that for adaptive adversaries,
anonymity is maintained as long as fewer than M/2 are
corrupted (thus, for a given maximum number t of cor-
rupted nodes, we can choose M > 2t to be the length of
the onion). For a non-adaptive adversary we can choose a
smaller M , since even if the adversary corrupts t > M/2
nodes, the probability that these will contain M/2 of the
nodes in a randomly chosen onion is still rather small.5
3.1.3 war Using Public-Key Cryptography
We now describe a protocol that achieves the best security
guarantees of all our protocols. However, its performance
is prohibitive for real applications, as we will see in Sec-
tion 5. This will be fixed by our main construction in Sec-
tion 3.2, which uses the protocol described in this section
for symmetric-key distribution (making its performance
characteristics less critical).
Consider again an anonymous point-to-point protocol,
such as onion routing. We propose a modification to the
protocol above, in which senders of radiograms do not
generally know who the receivers are (thus allowing for
better anonymity properties). Specifically, the protocol
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proceeds similarly to the one above, except that the onion
does not include the identity of the receiver for each layer,
thus departing from the traditional point-to-point onion
(we call this an undirected onion). We use the public-key
version here (all encryption and decryptions are asym-
metric), and combine this heavy weight protocol with a
much more efficient one in the next section. We provide
some more details about the protocol below, as it will be
used as a sub-protocol for our main construction.
There are three kinds of payloads in this protocol:
• Cover. Cover payloads are just random bit-strings,
and are sent any time a node wants to send a radio-
gram but has no outgoing traffic in its queue. The
goal of cover traffic (a form of traffic padding, simi-
lar to that used by MIXes [13], which is further dis-
cussed in Section 6) is to conceal the transmission
of real traffic (whether originating at the node or re-
layed through it), and thus defeat timing or other
inference attacks [6, 33, 48, 60].
• Message. Message payloads contain a message for
another node, intended to be passed up the protocol
stack by the intended recipient, and encrypted with
its public key.
• Encapsulation. Encapsulation payloads contain an-
other payload, and are intended to be retransmitted
after decryption and re-padding.
Upon receipt of a radiogram, every node adds the trans-
mitter’s public key (obtained from the radiogram) to a
table of current network members. This table is used
to select random nodes to route traffic through, as we
will see soon. Next, every node attempts to decrypt the
payload. Most of the time, the payload will not decrypt
correctly because it is encrypted with some other node’s
public key or is a cover payload. If the payload does de-
crypt correctly and it is of type message, it passes it up
the local protocol stack. If the decrypted payload is of
type encapsulation, it re-pads it out to the message size
of the received radiogram and adds it to its outgoing traf-
fic queue.
Finally, whether the message decrypted correctly or
not, the node consults its local randomized transmission
control function to determine whether it is time to send
the next radiogram in its output queue of which every
node maintains one. A node will transmit whenever either
of two conditions has occurred:
• If a timeout interval has passed since the last time
it has received any traffic. The primary purpose of
this timeout is to ensure that cover traffic is inserted
in the network, to frustrate timing analysis or other
inference attacks [33].
• After it has received a radiogram (whether it de-
crypted correctly or not) and a local random function
determines that it is time to transmit. This random
function will return “true” with probability approx-
imately 1/N , where N is a current estimate of the
total number of nodes currently in range. When this
occurs, the node waits a fixed interval (based on the
bandwidth to be consumed by the network) before
transmitting.
If a node has no outgoing traffic in its queue but is sched-
uled to transmit a radiogram anyway (e.g., when its time-
out has expired because its random transmission function
returned “true”) it sends a cover message. Otherwise, it
pulls a message from its outgoing queue and sends it.
To initiate an outgoing message to some group mem-
ber, a node selects at random a set of M − 1 current
group members, using the table of current network nodes
(and their public keys) that was described earlier. It then
creates an (undirected) “onion” of M encrypted encap-
sulated payloads, with the inner most payload encrypted
with the destinations public key, and adds the whole pack-
age to its outgoing message queue.
Note that this protocol is very inefficient on modern
computers because it requires a public key decryption op-
eration on every received radiogram by every node. The
value of this protocol is twofold: first, it is simple enough
to prove basic properties about it (as we informally sketch
below) and, second, it is useful as a building block for
more efficient protocols.
Security Analysis. It is not hard to prove that
(assuming employed encryption is secure), this protocol
achieves source and destination anonymity to observer,
for any adversary access structure C (not restricted in
size). Complete anonymity (even when the destination
is corrupted) is achieved as long as an adversary has not
corrupted all M nodes in the onion. This is guaranteed












Anonymity per radiogram can also be proven, which
implies that this protocol hides even the existence of com-
munication. Moreover, even the sender of a radiogram in
this protocol does not know who the receiver is, unless
the sender is also the source who prepared the radiogram
from scratch. This argument can be used to prove that an
adaptive or pro-active adversary cannot gain much more
information than a non-adaptive one in this protocol. Fi-
nally, as mentioned in Section 2, security against a Byzan-
tine adversary can be achieved by adding authentication.
Note that (as discussed in Section 2), all these security
guarantees are maintained for any scheduling of outgoing
radiograms by the transmission control function, as long
as it does not depend on the core traffic. Our choice of the
randomized function above is designed to optimize round
trip time.
3.2 Our Main Protocol
In this section, we describe our main protocol, which
achieves the same anonymity guarantees as the protocol
of Section 3.1.3, but with much better performance. The
fundamental performance limitation of the above proto-
col is that it requires a public-key operation (decryption)
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for each packet received, whether that packet was ad-
dressed to the node that received it or not. Ideally, such a
public-key scheme would allow for efficient determination
of whether the message would decrypt correctly, without
requiring a node to perform a full decryption of the mes-
sage. Unfortunately, we are aware of no public key cryp-
tosystems that have this property (which we believe mo-
tivates an interesting open cryptographic problem). Our
main protocol uses the protocol of Section 3.1.3 as a key
distribution sub-protocol for a more efficient hybrid pro-
tocol. In effect, our protocol simulates a public key cryp-
tosystem in which non-recipients need not do expensive
trial decryptions for data they will be unable to success-
fully decrypt.
Essentially, we run two protocols in parallel: the pro-
tocol of Section 3.1.3 at low bandwidth (configured to
occupy, e.g., 1
100
of the total channel computation or com-
munication bandwidth), and a more computationally ef-
ficient version of the protocol that uses symmetric keys.
Here, we refer to the part of the network running the
low-bandwidth sub-protocol (from Section 3.1.3) as the
key distribution subnet and that part running the efficient
symmetric sub-protocol as the traffic subnet. As we show
in the experimental evaluation in Section 5, the traffic
subnet has a network throughput of at least an order of
magnitude higher than that of the key distribution subnet.
When a new node joins the network, it must first join
the key distribution subnet, using the same procedures
and protocols as discussed in Section 3.1.3. Once part
of the network, it identifies the other nodes in range and
sends each of them via the key distribution protocol k
unique (random) symmetric (key, label) pairs (where the
label is derived from a cryptographic hash of the key). It
records each of these keys in a table, indexed by its label
and the node to which it was sent. Observe that by using
the public-key protocol, the receiver does not know which
node originated the symmetric keys.
Upon receipt of a key distribution message containing
(key, label) pairs, the receiver records the keys and labels
in a table, indexed by label. A node is free to delete
both any keys it sent and any keys it received at any
time from its tables, if it runs out of space; the number
of keys stored is a configuration parameter. In general,
extra keys should be deleted FIFO, but will be used (see
below) LIFO.
The traffic subnet uses these keys to encrypt and route
bulk message traffic. To send a message, a node selects
a routing as in the key distribution protocol, and succes-
sively encrypts the message. This time, however, it uses
the symmetric keys it sent to the nodes for the encryption.
Each encrypted layer is prefixed with the label of the key
used to encrypt it. Once a key is used, it is deleted from
the table.
Upon receipt of such a message, a node checks the key
label of the outermost encryption layer against its table of
received keys. If the key is not in the table, the message is
discarded. If it is, the message is decrypted and processed
as in the protocol of Section 3.1.3. New symmetric keys
are periodically sent via the key distribution subnet.
Observe that the processing of bulk traffic messages
is very efficient here; a node can immediately determine
whether it will be able to decrypt a received message,
and only symmetric cryptographic operations are required
even by the intended receiver. Security analysis of this
protocol follows directly from that of the previous section;
details are omitted here for brevity’s sake.
Note the frequency and method of key distribution
has some security implications. The strongest anonymity
properties (equivalent to the basic protocol) are obtained
if only one symmetric key is included in each message on
the key distribution subnet and each such key is used to
send at most one message on the traffic subnet. How-
ever, this carries with it a performance penalty, since
that means that every radiogram on the traffic subnet
has to have at least one corresponding radiogram on the
key distribution subnet. Furthermore, certain anonymity-
piercing attacks may be possible [32, 43, 51].
When more than one key is included in a given key
distribution subnet message or when the same key is used
to encrypt more than one message on the traffic subnet,
it becomes possible for the receiver to link messages from
the same sender together. This may be acceptable in prac-
tice, however, especially when multiple messages are part
of the same logical flow or if new keys are generated fre-
quently enough that only a limited number of messages
are linked together. Allowing the same key to be used
throughout a flow can greatly improve the overall effi-
ciency of the network by permitting the key distribution
subnet to be run at lower bandwidth.
4 Implementation
4.1 Simulation Environment
In order to get a feeling of how the various war proto-
cols would behave, we created a simulation environment,
implementing our constructions of Section 3 (with few
optimizations). Our goal in constructing this prototype
and simulation environment was to determine the behav-
ior and computational impact/demands of our protocols
on mobile devices.
Each node in the “radio network” is a PC connected
to a common Ethernet LAN. Radiograms are simulated
by multicast UDP packets; because of Ethernet limita-
tions, radiograms can thus be at most 1472 bytes long
(1500 bytes is the maximum Ethernet frame size, dimin-
ished by the 20 bytes of the IP header and the 8 bytes
of the UDP header). Multicast packets carry the IP
address of the sending node, and we can use this fea-
ture to infer the same sorts of information we could infer
by doing direction-finding on a radio network: we know
who the sending (real) node is, but we cannot know who
the intended recipient is without actually decrypting the
radiogram itself. In other words, an adversary sniffing
the network would get similar information about the ori-
gin and destination of each packet as someone sniffing
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a real-life wireless network with direction-finding equip-
ment. Smaller radiogram sizes can be easily defined. As
described in Section 3, each radiogram consists of a se-
quence of onion headers, followed by a payload, followed
by random padding. Each onion header contains descrip-
tive information, specifying whether this is an encapsula-
tion header, a final message header, or a control header;
a magic number to ensure that the header has been cor-
rectly decrypted when doing trial decryptions, the session
key and IV under which the payload have been encrypted,
and, if the header is a message header, the actual length
of the useful payload.
4.2 Implementation Details
We are interested in evaluating end-to-end behavior of
real network applications over an idealized war envi-
ronment; for this reason, we wanted our implementation
to give the illusion that access to the war environment
looked like access to any other network infrastructure. In
Unix terms, we needed a virtual interface with an IP ad-
dress which could be used to send IP datagrams from
and to. In order to avoid kernel-level development, which
would be hard to debug, we used the FreeBSD tun(4)
device driver; the driver links an entry in the /dev direc-
tory to a network interface. Packets sent by any socket
over, e.g., tun0 can be read by a user-level process from
/dev/tun0; similarly, packets written to /dev/tun0 appear
as if they had been received over the tun0 interface.
More specifically, we assigned 10.10.0.0/16 as the sub-
net of our war network. On each node, the tun0 interface
takes an address from that subnet. For example, on node
13, we see:
$ ifconfig tun0
tun0: flags=8051<UP,POINTOPOINT,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 560
inet 10.10.0.13 --> 10.10.255.254 netmask 0xffff0000
Opened by PID 58857
Note that, since the tunnel interface is defined as
a point-to-point interface, a fake destination address is
given. This is only used to trick the routing subsys-
tem to route packets destined for the 10.10.0.0/16 subnet
through the tunnel interface, as the following forwarding
table extract shows:
$ netstat -r -n -f inet
10.10/16 10.10.255.254 UGSc 0 10 tun0
10.10.0.13 127.0.0.1 UH 0 0 lo0
There is a war process running on each node. The
process reads from /dev/tun0. Reads are atomic, in that
the buffer given to the read() system call reading from
the tunnel file descriptor must be big enough to hold one
MTU’s worth of data. Once the data are read, they are
padded to a multiple of the (symmetric) encryption block
size, a message radiogram header is prepended to the re-
sult, and a sequence of onion headers is also calculated.
The onion is built as follows:
• For each header starting with the innermost (mes-
sage) header:
1) Generate a symmetric session key and IV.
2) AES-encrypt using the generated key/IV pair.
3) Place the key and IV in the header.
4) Encrypt the header with the intended destina-
tion’s public key.
Finally, the resulting packet is appended to the node’s
send queue, to be transmitted when its turn comes.
The war process also listens to UDP port 2003. The
socket is set to ignore its own transmissions. When it re-
ceives a packet, it checks to see that it is of the right length
(all radiograms must be of the same length). It then tries
to decrypt the first header’s worth of bytes with its own
private key. If it fails, the radiogram was not meant for
this node, and is discarded. If it decrypts correctly (as
evidenced by the correct decryption of the magic num-
ber) the rest of the radiogram is decrypted using the ses-
sion key and IV present in the header. If the radiogram
was of type message, the length field in the radiogram
header is checked, and that amount of bytes are sent to
the /dev/tun0 device (so that they will appear as traffic
received from the radio network to any process listening
on the radio address). If it is of a type other than ‘encap-
sulation’, it is silently discarded. Otherwise, the header
is discarded, the appropriate number of random bytes are
appended to the end of the radiogram (so that the size is
preserved), and the resulting packet is appended to the
send queue.
4.3 Queue Disciplines
So far, we have described typical undirected onion rout-
ing. If packets are forwarded by each intermediate node as
soon as they are received, some information about them
could be gleaned by observing rapid trains of radiograms.
To further protect against traffic analysis, we queue radio-
grams arriving or originating at each node, and transmit
them at a constant rate. If there are none to be sent, the
node will send cover traffic. To an observer, every node
is transmitting a constant stream of radiograms, and no
inferences can be made about the nature of the traffic.
As we shall show in Section 5, this is a very heavy-weight
protocol, and should thus only be used for key exchange.
First, let us observe that receiving a radiogram (even if
not meant for the receiving node), is CPU-bound; it takes
about 15ms on a 1GHz Pentium-class machine to decrypt
with a 1024-bit RSA key, quite a difference from the sub-
millisecond necessary to get a packet across the Ethernet,
but comparable to the process of computing an onion of 3
to 6 layers (encryption being about an order of magnitude
faster than decryption in our particular implementation).
Note that, in principle, the use of hardware cryptographic
accelerators can significantly improve the cryptographic
operation latency and throughput [36]. We experimented
with two queuing disciplines.
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The first discipline does not do any queuing; as soon
as a radiogram appears on the send queue, it is transmit-
ted. As mentioned above, this discipline is undesirable,
as we do not want the adversary to observe trains of ra-
diograms appearing in quick succession and thus be able
to infer the path of each onion (and thus each individual
originator). However, the discipline provides a baseline of
performance; this is the best we can do out of the available
network and CPU resources. Since this queue discipline
is only studied to provide a performance baseline, it does
not provide any cover traffic.
The second queue discipline is a leaky-bucket: each
node empties its queue at a constant rate, sending cover
traffic if there is nothing in the queue. This queue disci-
pline results in a uniform sharing of the available band-
width by all the nodes; however, for this to work well,
the number of nodes must be known in advance, and not
change. Estimating the number of nodes is not hard; us-
ing feedback from the media access layer (a realistic as-
sumption), we can know what fraction of the time the
medium goes unused, or how many packet collisions oc-
cur; the sending rate can be adjusted to keep the medium
full.
Notice that there is no need to randomize the order of
messages in the queue. Since all nodes transmit at a con-
stant rate, and cover messages are indistinguishable from
legitimate ones, reordering would not add any security
(and may cause problems at the network layer, as TCP
does not react well to reordering).
What about the end-to-end behavior of protocols run-
ning on top of the radiogram network? The underlying
network appears as a long, thin pipe. Applications that
do not implement congestion-control mechanisms, such
as ICMP or UDP, will lose packets when the network be-
comes overloaded. TCP, on the other hand, will interpret
losses as resulting from congestion and back off, allowing
the queues to drain. Because TCP works better when the
round-trip delays are consistent, a queue discipline that
encourages that should be preferred over one that allows
round-trip times to vary wildly.
5 Performance Evaluation
While building a complete system requires evaluation in
high-fidelity conditions (i.e., using actual wireless de-
vices), our goal here is more limited: we wish to determine
the behavior and computational impact/demands of our
protocols on mobile devices, without taking into consid-
eration other aspects of the system that have no bearing
on the protocols themselves.
We took performance measurements on a group of
eight Pentium-III class machines running at 800MHz, on a
100Mbps shared (not switched) Ethernet. Although not
faithful to a wireless environment, the shared Ethernet
testbed allows us to simulate (imperfectly) a broadcast
radio environment. We used a constant payload length
of 560 bytes, large enough to contain 512 bytes of useful
TCP payload, but also small enough so that small pack-
ets (such as TCP ACKs) would not be too wasteful of
network resources. We evaluated each of the two queu-
ing disciplines at three different RSA6 key lengths (512,
768, and 1024 bits), with onions 0-, 1-, 2-, and 6-deep (0
meaning no onion routing was being used). The results
are shown in Tables 1 and 2, and graphically in Figure 1.
Note that Table 2 does not include results for 1024-bit
RSA as testbed machines could not keep up with the re-
quired packet rate (25 packets/second).
Observe that the round trip times with such a low
packet rate vary wildly. This is expected, since the ma-
chines are not running with synchronized clocks and even
their own clocks have some jitter. The TCP throughput
also has a very high variance, which is also expected; an-
alyzing the effects of the particular queuing discipline on
TCP however is beyond the scope of this paper. Note that
both directions of a TCP connection were anonymized.
As can be seen from these results, the key distribution
subnet is very slow. Especially when using cover traf-
fic, at 25 packets/second per node, the TCP throughput
drops significantly. The primary constraining factor in
the key distribution subnet throughput is the computa-
tional overhead of RSA, as can be observed by the de-
cline in throughput as we increase the key size. Using
a public-key cryptosystem where the cost of encryption
vs. the cost of decryption is more balanced would not
have improved performance since all nodes try to decrypt
all radiograms. Using higher-performance nodes would
have improved throughput, at the expense of increased
power consumption — a critical factor in MANET envi-
ronments. Alternatively, at a more modest power con-
sumption, we could make use of hardware cryptographic
accelerators. While the typical accelerator does not sig-
nificantly improve performance of public-key operations
(due to the difficulty in parallelizing the underlying algo-
rithm), as shown by Keromytis et al. [36], use of off-board
crypto-processors would improve overall system perfor-
mance by off-loading CPU-intensive operations to sec-
ondary logic.
The heavyweight protocol (key distribution subnet) is
clearly unsuitable for sustained high-rate traffic. It should
only be used to distribute session keys for use by the
lightweight protocol (traffic subnet) that uses symmetric-
key cryptography, described in Section 3.2. The perfor-
mance of that protocol is given in Tables 3 and 4, and
graphically in Figure 2. As can be seen by those exper-
iments, the performance of the symmetric-key protocol
is at least an order of magnitude higher than that of
the public-key protocol, justifying our use of a two-tier
protocol hierarchy. Even when using 6-hop onions with
250 packets/second cover traffic, the throughput achieved
is sufficient to sustain a high-quality bi-directional voice
communication channel (a typical application in military
MANETs). Further performance improvements can be
obtained through the use of hardware cryptographic ac-
6While RSA does not provide key anonymity [4], we used RSA
for prototyping expediency.
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Table 1: Key distribution subnet, no queuing
512-bit RSA 768-bit RSA 1024-bit RSA
#L RTT (ms) TCP (Kbps) RTT (ms) TCP (Kbps) RTT (ms) TCP (Kbps)
0 10.6/10.7/10.9 456 21.3/21.9/26.3 188 46.2/48.4/53.5 83
1 19.9/20.5/21.1 220 41.0/42.7/46.5 84 91.0/93.3/101 39
2 30.3/31.5/35.7 119 61.6/66.7/76.0 63 133/141/146 26
6 68.7/73.5/79.4 58 146/149/154 23 315/326/332 11
Table 2: Key distribution subnet, with a queue discipline using 25 packets/second. In this experiment, our testbed
machines could not encrypt packets fast enough when using 1024-bit RSA keys.
512-bit RSA 768-bit RSA
#L RTT (ms) TCP (Kbps) RTT (ms) TCP (Kbps)
0 38/152/312 43 45/355/983 39
1 71/213/415 20 188/391/698 20
2 161/375/1075 12 243/602/930 15
Figure 1: Key distribution subnet, both queue disciplines
(summary of Tables 1 and 2).
celerators, since symmetric-key cryptography algorithms
are highly amenable to parallelized processing [36].
6 Related Work
Previous work has identified a larger security problem in
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) than with conven-
tional wired and wireless networks [17, 69]. The main
concerns are: (a) the use of wireless links makes certain
types of attacks (eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle, de-
nial of service, etc.) much easier in a MANET; (b) secu-
rity solutions that take advantage of static configurations,
such as the restrictions in the network topology that are
exploited by traditional firewalls, are not applicable in a
mobile environment; (c) MANETs depend on the coop-
eration of all nodes for their correct, or at least efficient,
operation. Misbehaving nodes are typically difficult to
detect and contain [46, 66]. Marti et al. apply intru-
sion detection to the problem of misbehaving routers in
Figure 2: Traffic distribution subnet, both queue disci-
plines (summary of Tables 3 and 4).
a MANET, while Deng et al. [17] take a preventive ap-
proach to the same problem. Finally, the nature of nodes
that typically participate on a MANET (low computation
and bandwidth capabilities, limited power budget) expose
them to new attacks (e.g., power exhaustion through re-
peated packet retransmission [3]) or increase their vulner-
ability to known attacks by making it difficult to adopt
expensive mechanisms.
ANODR [37] is an anonymous on-demand routing
protocol that hides network identifiers in multi-hop
MANETs. The main challenge in such environments (in
contrast to our network model of global broadcast) is
enabling route discovery between two arbitrary nodes,
while providing sender and/or receiver anonymity (and
sender/receiver unlinkability). ANODR uses broadcast
with trapdoor information, which is similar to our broad-
cast scheme, to transmit packets between nodes. The
primary difference with our work is that in our scheme,
the originating node selects (and varies) the transmis-
sion paths, whereas in ANODR the paths are dictated
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Table 3: Traffic subnet using the symmetric-key proto-
col, no queuing.





Table 4: Traffic subnet using the symmetric-key proto-
col, with a queue discipline using 250 packets/second.
#L RTT (ms) TCP (Kbps)
0 7/28/58 360 (sdev: 72)
1 16/44/96 166 (sdev: 31)
2 48/142/522 119 (sdev: 28)
6 83/144/214 63 (sdev: 14)
by the wireless network topology. Thus, to achieve
practical anonymity, MIXes (which introduce high la-
tency) must be used. ANODR [37] requires a new pub-
lic/private key pair for every forwarded message. Sim-
ilar routing-based schemes are explored in other work
[7, 54, 67, 68, 70]. Zhang et al. [67, 68] address
both MAC- and network-layer anonymity in a multi-hop
MANET by using pairing-based cryptography to generate
a large number of pseudonyms per node. However Mask
[68] contains, in plaintext, the final destination within ev-
ery routing request message. Schemes similar to Mask are
described by Lu et al. [42] and Lin et al. [41]. Boukerche
et al. [8] propose using trust and reputation to avoid using
untrustworthy nodes in their anonymous routing scheme.
None of these schemes uses cover traffic to protect
against a global passive adversary over time. Yang et
al. [65] extend ANODR by lowering the computation
overhead (and eliminating the need for key exchange or
any PKI-like infrastructure), at the cost of lower privacy
guarantees (only source anonymity and routing privacy)
that expose the message destination. In some scenarios
that interest us (e.g., battlefield), the message destina-
tion can be unacceptably revealing, especially when com-
bined with packet-flow volume information (e.g., a com-
mand HQ will be more “highly” connected). Seys and
Preneel [52] propose establishing pairwise secret keys be-
tween neighboring MANET nodes, and use onion routes
over these to route traffic anonymously. Their scheme
is somewhat more complex than ours because it oper-
ates over a non-broadcast domain (i.e., not all nodes can
hear all transmissions). Chain-based Anonymous Routing
(CAR) [53] uses a similar approach.
Jiang et al. [35] examine the problem of selecting
routes from among various MIXes in a wireless ad hoc
network. Jiang et al. [34] also study the use of per-flow
vs. per-link cover traffic in a wireless ad hoc network,
and concludes that the latter is less expensive in terms
of required “dummy” packets, but requires encryption of
each link. We extend their work for a broadcast medium
with link-level encryption, which allows use of per-node
constant-rate cover traffic, further reducing the amount of
necessary dummy packets. Kong et al. [38] focus on pro-
tecting the mobility patterns of nodes in a geographical
area.
Wu and Li [64] propose a model similar to ours, using
onion routing in wireless mesh sensor networks to pro-
vide anonymity. However, because of the nature of the
sensor network (all information is aggregated toward the
gateway, and individual nodes are extremely lightweight),
their scheme does not use cover traffic, making it suscepti-
ble to a passive global adversary attack. They propose us-
ing a ring structure [9] to hide the identity of the commu-
nication endpoints. Other related work uses multicasting
along with incomparable public keys to provide receiver
anonymity [61]. von Ahn et al. [58] propose the concept
of “sender k-anonymity,” whereby an attacker can only
determine that the sender of a message was one among k
entities.
Traditional anonymizing approaches focus on hiding
the client’s identity, and only take the traffic rate into
consideration insofar as it facilitates traffic analysis by an
observer. However, the fundamental assumption behind
most of these approaches were that an adversary did not
(or could not) have global view of the network. While
this may be realistic in a wide-area wired infrastructure,
it is inappropriate in a local-area MANET, where the at-
tacker can eavesdrop and triangulate on any communica-
tion. Traditional approaches against traffic analysis at-
tacks [27, 28, 30, 48, 56, 57] focus on individual links,
based on the “wired infrastructure” assumption. The
most basic anonymity solution is to interpose a proxy be-
tween two communicating parties [15]. The usefulness
of this approach is limited to certain applications such
as Web browsing under certain weak threat assumptions.
However, various timing channels can be exploited to
determine correlations between incoming and outbound
traffic on such a proxy [6, 60].
Chaum’s MIXes [13] were an early proposal to create
an untraceable email system. The system was based on
special-purpose nodes, called MIXes, which perform the
anonymizing by re-ordering received messages and for-
warding them through the MIX network. Under this ap-
proach, and subsequent work on various remailers that
were put in service, an eavesdropper can only determine
that a participant is communicating with the MIX. Traf-
fic padding and message fragmentation are needed to pro-
tect against adversaries that can monitor the entire MIX
network, as may be the case with a wireless network. DC-
Nets [14, 59] is another proposal for constructing untrace-
able communication networks, based on oblivious coin
flipping.
Mixes have been implemented for many types of com-
munication, such as e-mail (e.g., [29]), ISDN service [47],
IP-layer infrastructure [44], and general synchronous com-
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munication (including web browsing, see below). Mixes
have also been used to anonymize location information in
mobile telephony systems [21, 22]. Minx [16] is a crypto-
graphic message format for encoding anonymous messages
relayed through a network of Chaumian mixes, and is de-
signed to protect against passive and active adversaries,
as well as corrupt mix nodes. A more efficient version
of MIXes that trades off complete mixing is discussed by
Boneh and Golle [5].
ANON [39] is an IP-layer anonymizing infrastructure,
allowing server addresses to be hidden from clients, and
vice versa. It uses a set of network-resident nodes that act
as anonymizing forwarders, similar to Chaum’s MIXes.
One basic assumption is that an attacker cannot monitor
or subvert the whole ANON infrastructure itself, which is
arguably realistic in certain scenarios (e.g., in countering
DoS attacks on servers) but inappropriate in a MANET.
In follow-on work [40], they introduce the concept of on-
demand link padding, which adds padding traffic based on
the bandwidth usage observed from real traffic. In the-
ory, this allows the amount of the padding to be limited.
However, this approach will still reveal the source or des-
tination of many traffic flows (e.g., a military HQ), since
it is only done on a per-link basis.
Onion Routing [25, 49] is an extension to MIXes that
supports synchronous communication, such as web brows-
ing. It uses nested encrypted addresses, called an onion,
constructed by the initiator of a connection. The secu-
rity of onion routing is analyzed by Syverson et al. [55].
Each successive onion router peels off a layer and for-
wards the connection. To avoid public key operations
on a per-packet basis, onion routers use per-connection
symmetric secret keys. Link padding is mentioned as a
mechanism for countering traffic analysis. A connection-
less approach that is otherwise similar to Onion Routing
is Non-Disclosure Method (NDM) [20]. Tor, the second-
generation onion router [18], also supports integrity pro-
tection, congestion control, and location-hidden services
via rendezvous points.
Crowds [50] is a web-oriented peer-to-peer anonymiz-
ing infrastructure for synchronous communications. The
main difference between Crowds and MIX-based solutions
such as Onion Routing is that the routing path and the
path length in Crowds are dynamic, versus static rout-
ing and preset path lengths in MIX networks. Analy-
sis has shown that without active participation by the
users of the anonymity system, there are attacks against
anonymity that are more severe against Crowds than
against MIXes [62, 63]. At the same time, there are at-
tacks that work better against MIX-based solutions than
against Crowds [23]. There are properties of both of these
types of attacks that are specific to Web browsing on per-
sonal computers, so they are not directly relevant to our
solution.
Tarzan [24] is an IP-layer anonymizing system that
uses a peer-to-peer network to hide the client’s identity
and provides anonymity against casual eavesdroppers and
small numbers of malicious participants. Tarzan also pre-
vents global adversaries from determining which partici-
pant sent a particular message, but does not protect traffic
sinks or hide the amount of traffic generated by a node.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Anonymity has many potentially interesting applications
in wireless networks, but conventional protocols do not
work well in these environments. We have introduced a
security model for wireless anonymity as well as a suite of
protocols that provides basic anonymity functions in lo-
cal broadcast networks. Our analytical and experimental
results suggest that the protocols are realistic and suffi-
ciently efficient to be useful in practice for many applica-
tions.
A number of interesting and significant problems re-
main, however. Admission control and network manage-
ment is perhaps the most significant area here: how do we
control network membership, especially in ad-hoc public
networks, and how can we best link such networks to-
gether? How do anonymity networks perform under, and
how can they adapt to, highly dynamic and difficult radio
conditions (especially where there are many, mostly dis-
joint, users with only a few links between them)? And, of
course, issues of scale are likely to be especially difficult.
We believe the model and analysis we presented in this
paper will serve as a useful launching pad to answering
these interesting questions.
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